Forgot Password/Username?
Mar - 08 - 2026 Download The Version
After a difficult process, the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) approved the ministerial lineup of the government headed by Dr. Shaye’ Al-Zindani, which consists of 35 ministers representing a diverse mix, a “consensus government” designed to satisfy all parties and political components. While this diversity of expertise and experience may offer elements of success, it also carries potential seeds of failure, lack of cohesion, and increased government expenditures. Political and economic conditions witnessed cautious optimism during February, with the IRG returning to Aden, holding its first meetings, and announcing the start of preparations for the state’s general budget for 2026. This coincided with clear support from the Saudi Arabia, which announced a grant of 1.3 billion Saudi riyals (approximately $346.59 million) to help cover the budget deficit. Despite the challenges faced by the IRG of Yemen, particularly protests by supporters of the Southern Transitional Council (STC), who attempted to storm the government headquarters in Ma’ashiq Palace in Aden, the IRG managed to partially overcome the crisis with Saudi support, which was present on the ground both morally and financially. The IRG of Yemen is operating at a slower pace than expected. Its activities have largely been limited to internal meetings and communication with representatives of foreign diplomatic missions and international funding organizations. At the same time, electricity services have improved noticeably, and commercial activity has revived as a result of Saudi support, although the liquidity crisis in the local currency has worsened. Direct cash assistance from Saudi Arabia, along with remittances from expatriates, has helped maintain a reasonable level of foreign currency reserves. However, imbalances in monetary circulation within the market have led to a shortage of local currency liquidity. This prompted the Aden-CBY to take a series of measures, including raising the value of the Yemeni riyal against the Saudi riyal and obligating banks to purchase foreign currency, but these measures have not alleviated the worsening crisis. Dr. Shaye’ Al-Zindani enjoys relatively broad acceptance among all parties. Despite the lack of cohesion in his broadly structured government, it includes relatively clean and professionally reputable cadres, which creates a degree of optimism regarding the normalization of conditions and overcoming the repercussions of the “surgical operation” that followed the STC forces’ control over Hadhramout and Al-Mahra and the events that followed. However, the measure of success or failure does not depend solely on the IRG. The manner in which Saudi Arabia manages the file, as well as its future relationship with the UAE and its local allies, will play a fundamental role in determining the government’s ability to operate effectively on the ground. This is closely linked to unifying the various military and security factions under the leadership of the Ministries of Defense and Interior, controlling the financial funding received by different parties inside Yemen, and transforming Saudi support into sustainable development assistance. It also depends on the level of harmony and full coordination between the PLC and the IRG, as well as among members of the government themselves, and their ability to overcome numerous challenges representing the legacy of ten years of manufactured chaos in Yemen. This bulletin provides a broad overview of declared intentions for reforms and various government activities aimed at restoring confidence in the government among the international community and donors more than among ordinary Yemeni citizens. Meanwhile, major service-related problems continue, including the persistence of illegal levies, despite IRG directives to abolish them, the domestic gas crisis, and the fragility of the health and education systems, among other issues. On the other hand, areas under the control of the Houthi group are witnessing a state of unannounced public unrest due to the worsening economic and humanitarian crisis, driven by economic contraction, cases of bankruptcy in banks and commercial and industrial establishments, and the ongoing liquidity crisis. The bulletin documented businesses that have closed as a result of deteriorating economic conditions in areas controlled by the Houthi group, in addition to the increasing manifestations of poverty and begging due to a significant decline in sources of income. Economic activity in Houthi-controlled areas is heading along a dangerous trajectory that warns of catastrophic repercussions on all levels, particularly economic and social ones. The Houthi group is attempting, through its strict security grip, to conceal the crisis and search for external justifications for it.
After a difficult process, the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) approved the ministerial lineup of the government headed by Dr. Shaye’ Al-Zindani, which consists of 35 ministers representing a diverse mix, a “consensus government” designed to satisfy all parties and political components. While this diversity of expertise and experience may offer elements of success, it also carries potential seeds of failure, lack of cohesion, and increased government expenditures.
Political and economic conditions witnessed cautious optimism during February, with the IRG returning to Aden, holding its first meetings, and announcing the start of preparations for the state’s general budget for 2026. This coincided with clear support from the Saudi Arabia, which announced a grant of 1.3 billion Saudi riyals (approximately $346.59 million) to help cover the budget deficit.
Despite the challenges faced by the IRG of Yemen, particularly protests by supporters of the Southern Transitional Council (STC), who attempted to storm the government headquarters in Ma’ashiq Palace in Aden, the IRG managed to partially overcome the crisis with Saudi support, which was present on the ground both morally and financially.
The IRG of Yemen is operating at a slower pace than expected. Its activities have largely been limited to internal meetings and communication with representatives of foreign diplomatic missions and international funding organizations. At the same time, electricity services have improved noticeably, and commercial activity has revived as a result of Saudi support, although the liquidity crisis in the local currency has worsened.
Direct cash assistance from Saudi Arabia, along with remittances from expatriates, has helped maintain a reasonable level of foreign currency reserves. However, imbalances in monetary circulation within the market have led to a shortage of local currency liquidity. This prompted the Aden-CBY to take a series of measures, including raising the value of the Yemeni riyal against the Saudi riyal and obligating banks to purchase foreign currency, but these measures have not alleviated the worsening crisis.
Dr. Shaye’ Al-Zindani enjoys relatively broad acceptance among all parties. Despite the lack of cohesion in his broadly structured government, it includes relatively clean and professionally reputable cadres, which creates a degree of optimism regarding the normalization of conditions and overcoming the repercussions of the “surgical operation” that followed the STC forces’ control over Hadhramout and Al-Mahra and the events that followed.
However, the measure of success or failure does not depend solely on the IRG. The manner in which Saudi Arabia manages the file, as well as its future relationship with the UAE and its local allies, will play a fundamental role in determining the government’s ability to operate effectively on the ground.
This is closely linked to unifying the various military and security factions under the leadership of the Ministries of Defense and Interior, controlling the financial funding received by different parties inside Yemen, and transforming Saudi support into sustainable development assistance.
It also depends on the level of harmony and full coordination between the PLC and the IRG, as well as among members of the government themselves, and their ability to overcome numerous challenges representing the legacy of ten years of manufactured chaos in Yemen.
This bulletin provides a broad overview of declared intentions for reforms and various government activities aimed at restoring confidence in the government among the international community and donors more than among ordinary Yemeni citizens. Meanwhile, major service-related problems continue, including the persistence of illegal levies, despite IRG directives to abolish them, the domestic gas crisis, and the fragility of the health and education systems, among other issues.
On the other hand, areas under the control of the Houthi group are witnessing a state of unannounced public unrest due to the worsening economic and humanitarian crisis, driven by economic contraction, cases of bankruptcy in banks and commercial and industrial establishments, and the ongoing liquidity crisis.
The bulletin documented businesses that have closed as a result of deteriorating economic conditions in areas controlled by the Houthi group, in addition to the increasing manifestations of poverty and begging due to a significant decline in sources of income.
Economic activity in Houthi-controlled areas is heading along a dangerous trajectory that warns of catastrophic repercussions on all levels, particularly economic and social ones. The Houthi group is attempting, through its strict security grip, to conceal the crisis and search for external justifications for it.