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Feb - 08 - 2026 Download The Version
Political developments dominated public attention in Yemen throughout January, particularly following what was described as a “surgical operation” within the components of the IRG of Yemen. This process resulted in ending the control of the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC), which advocates secession, over the governorates of Hadhramout and Al-Mahra, and was followed by the STC’s announcement of its dissolution from the Saudi capital, Riyadh. With the withdrawal of the United Arab Emirates from Yemen at the request of the Yemeni government, the Saudi Arabia inherited full responsibility under what is known as the “Arab Coalition to Support IRG of Yemen.” Saudi Arabia has since assumed the role of an elder brother, or guardian, so to speak, across all dimensions: security, military, political, and economic. These security and political developments in 2025 December and early January cast a heavy shadow over economic and humanitarian conditions. They resulted in the dismissal of former Prime Minister Salem bin Buraik and the appointment of Dr. Shaea’ Al-Zindani as his successor, along with the formation of a new government. During this period, institutions of the IRG of Yemen experienced an almost complete vacuum for more than a month, due to the collective departure of most government officials to Riyadh, including political, security, and military leaders affiliated with the Southern Transitional Council. Recent developments prompted Saudi Arabia to announce that it would fill the gap left by the UAE’s exit. Accordingly, Saudi Arabia began paying salaries to all security and military forces, particularly those that had previously received direct funding from the UAE. It also undertook to disburse delayed salaries of civilian employees from 2025, amounting to approximately USD 90 million, and to cover the operational needs of power generation stations in the southern governorates. Saudi involvement in Yemen has not been limited to financial support. Saudi supervisory teams have become more present on the ground than Yemen’ state institutions themselves, which are experiencing near-total absence. Electricity supply hours improved significantly to levels not witnessed in Aden since its liberation from Houthi forces 10 years ago. In addition, violations against citizens originating from northern regions who travel to or from the temporary capital Aden have noticeably declined. Stability in the Yemeni currency ( Riyal) continued, supported by inflows of foreign currency from Saudi Arabia amounting to nearly one billion Saudi riyals. These inflows came in the form of salary payments, direct energy support, and financing allocations for projects across various sectors. Conversely, currency speculators attempted to exploit the developments to disrupt the market; however, the Yemeni Central Bank in Aden responded firmly. This coincided with a minor liquidity shortage of the local currency, which did not significantly affect economic activity, particularly given the Aden-CBY’s adequate reserves of local cash. Despite the positive political and economic indicators, the Yemeni public remains cautiously watchful regarding the extent to which conditions in the southern governorates will be normalized. Questions persist over whether the new government and all institutions of legitimacy will be able to return to Aden and resume normal operations, especially in light of ongoing protests by supporters of STC President Aidrous Al-Zubaidi calling for secession, and the continued incitement against the Chairman of the Presidential Leadership Council and the internationally recognized authorities. Meanwhile, the economic and humanitarian crisis continues in areas under Houthi control, driven by U.S. sanctions, the contraction of economic activity resulting from the group’s economic policies, and the suspension of most support and assistance programs previously provided by international organizations and UN agencies in those areas. Several international organizations have announced the suspension of their programs in Houthi-controlled areas, including the World Food Programme, due to restrictions imposed on humanitarian workers and the group’s continued detention of approximately 73 employees of international organizations and UN agencies. Many of these detainees have been prosecuted on charges of treason and espionage. Despite controlling state revenues in areas under its authority, the Houthi group has refrained from paying salaries and from continuing the provision of public services to citizens. Recently, it blocked the mobile applications of several commercial banks operating in Yemen, aiming to pressure them into relocating their headquarters back to Sana’a. The Houthi group also controls the international dialing code and the international internet gateway through the state-owned companies TeleYemen and YemenNet. A number of well-known restaurants in Sana’a have declared bankruptcy due to the deteriorating economic and humanitarian situation, alongside rising public anger over the group’s continued imposition of levies and revenue collection without fulfilling any corresponding service obligations to society.
Political developments dominated public attention in Yemen throughout January, particularly following what was described as a “surgical operation” within the components of the IRG of Yemen. This process resulted in ending the control of the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC), which advocates secession, over the governorates of Hadhramout and Al-Mahra, and was followed by the STC’s announcement of its dissolution from the Saudi capital, Riyadh.
With the withdrawal of the United Arab Emirates from Yemen at the request of the Yemeni government, the Saudi Arabia inherited full responsibility under what is known as the “Arab Coalition to Support IRG of Yemen.” Saudi Arabia has since assumed the role of an elder brother, or guardian, so to speak, across all dimensions: security, military, political, and economic.
These security and political developments in 2025 December and early January cast a heavy shadow over economic and humanitarian conditions. They resulted in the dismissal of former Prime Minister Salem bin Buraik and the appointment of Dr. Shaea’ Al-Zindani as his successor, along with the formation of a new government. During this period, institutions of the IRG of Yemen experienced an almost complete vacuum for more than a month, due to the collective departure of most government officials to Riyadh, including political, security, and military leaders affiliated with the Southern Transitional Council.
Recent developments prompted Saudi Arabia to announce that it would fill the gap left by the UAE’s exit. Accordingly, Saudi Arabia began paying salaries to all security and military forces, particularly those that had previously received direct funding from the UAE. It also undertook to disburse delayed salaries of civilian employees from 2025, amounting to approximately USD 90 million, and to cover the operational needs of power generation stations in the southern governorates.
Saudi involvement in Yemen has not been limited to financial support. Saudi supervisory teams have become more present on the ground than Yemen’ state institutions themselves, which are experiencing near-total absence. Electricity supply hours improved significantly to levels not witnessed in Aden since its liberation from Houthi forces 10 years ago. In addition, violations against citizens originating from northern regions who travel to or from the temporary capital Aden have noticeably declined.
Stability in the Yemeni currency ( Riyal) continued, supported by inflows of foreign currency from Saudi Arabia amounting to nearly one billion Saudi riyals. These inflows came in the form of salary payments, direct energy support, and financing allocations for projects across various sectors. Conversely, currency speculators attempted to exploit the developments to disrupt the market; however, the Yemeni Central Bank in Aden responded firmly. This coincided with a minor liquidity shortage of the local currency, which did not significantly affect economic activity, particularly given the Aden-CBY’s adequate reserves of local cash.
Despite the positive political and economic indicators, the Yemeni public remains cautiously watchful regarding the extent to which conditions in the southern governorates will be normalized. Questions persist over whether the new government and all institutions of legitimacy will be able to return to Aden and resume normal operations, especially in light of ongoing protests by supporters of STC President Aidrous Al-Zubaidi calling for secession, and the continued incitement against the Chairman of the Presidential Leadership Council and the internationally recognized authorities.
Meanwhile, the economic and humanitarian crisis continues in areas under Houthi control, driven by U.S. sanctions, the contraction of economic activity resulting from the group’s economic policies, and the suspension of most support and assistance programs previously provided by international organizations and UN agencies in those areas.
Several international organizations have announced the suspension of their programs in Houthi-controlled areas, including the World Food Programme, due to restrictions imposed on humanitarian workers and the group’s continued detention of approximately 73 employees of international organizations and UN agencies. Many of these detainees have been prosecuted on charges of treason and espionage.
Despite controlling state revenues in areas under its authority, the Houthi group has refrained from paying salaries and from continuing the provision of public services to citizens. Recently, it blocked the mobile applications of several commercial banks operating in Yemen, aiming to pressure them into relocating their headquarters back to Sana’a. The Houthi group also controls the international dialing code and the international internet gateway through the state-owned companies TeleYemen and YemenNet.
A number of well-known restaurants in Sana’a have declared bankruptcy due to the deteriorating economic and humanitarian situation, alongside rising public anger over the group’s continued imposition of levies and revenue collection without fulfilling any corresponding service obligations to society.